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Abstract— In this paper, we show the equivalence between
a constrained, multi-agent control problem, modeled within
the port-Hamiltonian framework, and an exact potential game.
Specifically, critical distance-based constraints determine a
network of double-integrator agents, which can be represented
as a graph. Virtual couplings, i.e., pairs of spring-damper,
assigned to each edge of the graph, allow to synthesize a
distributed, gradient-based control law that steers the network
to an invariant set of stable configurations. We characterize the
points belonging to such set as Nash equilibria of the associated
potential game, relating the parameters of the virtual couplings
with the equilibrium seeking problem, since they are crucial
to shape the transient behaviour (i.e., the convergence) and,
ideally, the set of reachable equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed control of networked, multi-agent systems is a
hot topic within the system-and-control community, since a
peculiar characteristic of modern society is the ubiquitous-
ness of large-scale systems with a complex network structure,
involving interacting, (possibly) autonomous subsystems.
In the last few years, the control of agents governed
by a double-integrator dynamics has been widely investi-
gated, both including typical consensus protocols [1]–[4]
and formation/distance-based issues [5]–[8]. In this context,
we consider double-integrator agents which have to satisfy
critical, distance-based constraints that couple each others,
defining a network that can be described as vertices and
edges of an arbitrarily oriented graph. Successively, the
network is recast within the port-Hamiltonian framework,
closely related with the passivity theory [9], [10]. Virtual
couplings, i.e., pairs of spring and damper in parallel, are
assigned to each edge, in order to define the interaction forces
among neighboring agents, while preserving the passivity
of the network. This leads to a distributed, gradient-based
control law that steers the system to a stable configuration.
On the same leitmotiv of [11], we identify an intriguing
affinity between the port-Hamiltonian formulation of the
constrained control problem and a potential game, which
revolves around the concept of Nash Equilibrium (NE).
Along this direction, the convergence to a NE in games
involving continuous-time, passive systems has been recently
addressed in several works. Specifically, [12]–[14] proposed
passive techniques to solve the Nash equilibrium seeking
problem over networks and in finite games, while [15]–
[17] focused on the relation between passivity and evolu-
tionary/stable games.
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Our work moves towards a novel interpretation of physi-
cal, multi-agent systems admitting a port-Hamiltonian model,
providing a potential game-theoretic perspective. We envi-
sion that each agent aims at minimizing its energetic contri-
bution within the network by seeking for an ad hoc strategy
that satisfies distance-based constraints. Here, the role of the
virtual couplings is key, since they exhibit symmetries across
the decision variables of the agents, i.e., two connected
agents showing the same deviation in term of strategy reflect
in exactly the same amount of deviation on the respective
objective functions. This is crucial to prove the existence
of an exact potential game associated to the related control
problem. Moreover, the parameters of each pair of spring-
damper can be chosen to shape both the transient behaviour
of the network and the set of reachable equilibria within the
associated Nash Equilibrium Problem (NEP) [18].
The paper is organized as follows: after some basic pre-
liminary recall (§II), we model the constrained, multi-agent
control problem within the port-Hamiltonian framework,
synthesizing a distributed, gradient-based control law that
steers the network to a stable configuration (§III). Succes-
sively, we attach a potential game-theoretic perspective to the
addressed control problem, providing equivalence results that
characterize the set of Nash equilibria and the convergence
to one of them (§IV). Finally, numerical simulations support
the theoretical results given in the previous sections (§V).
Notation: R, R>0 and R≥0 denote the set of real, positive
real, non-negative real numbers, respectively. Sn0 (Sn<0) de-
notes the set of symmetric, positive (semi-)definite matrices.
Given vectors x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn, x := (x1; . . . ;xN ) denotes(
x>1 , . . . , x
>
N
)> ∈ RnN . A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker
product between matrices A and B. ‖x‖ is the 2-norm of the
vector x, while |S| denotes the cardinality of the set S. Ck
is the class of k-times continuously differentiable functions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We start with some basic definitions of port-Hamiltonian
systems and game theory. Specifically, the generalized input-
state-output dynamics within the port-Hamiltonian frame-
work reads as [9]:
x˙ = (S(x)−D(x))∂H
∂x
+G(x)u,
y = G>(x)
∂H
∂x
,
where x ∈ Rn denotes the state, u ∈ Rm the control
input and y ∈ Rm the output. S ∈ Rn×n, D ∈ Sn<0
and G ∈ Rn×m are a skew-symmetric, a dissipation and
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an input matrix, respectively, while H : Rn → R≥0
is the Hamiltonian function. A system admitting a port-
Hamiltonian representation is passive with storage function
H , since it directly falls into the following definition.
Definition 1 ([9]): A map u 7→ y is passive if there exists
a C1, lower bounded function of the state, V : Rn → R≥0
(storage function), such that
V˙ (x) ≤ u>y ⇐⇒ V (x(t))−V (x(0)) ≤
∫ t
0
u>(τ)y(τ) dτ.

In this paper, we show some equivalence results that
connect a constrained, multi-agent control problem, mod-
eled within the port-Hamiltonian framework, and a potential
game. With this aim, a game Γ := (I, {Ji}i∈I , {Xi}i∈I)
consists of N agents, indexed by the set I := {1, . . . , N},
each one controlling its own variable, xi ∈ Xi ⊆ Rn, and
aims at minimizing its objective function, Ji : RnN → R.
Hence, we refer to x := (x1; . . . ;xN ) ∈ RnN as the
collective vector of strategies and to x−i ∈ R(n−1)N as the
vector of all the players’ decisions except those of player i.
To emphasize the i-th decision variable within the collective
vector, sometimes we write x as (xi,x−i).
For the remainder of this section, we assume that, for all
i ∈ I and all x−i, Ji ∈ C1, Ji(·,x−i) is convex and Xi is
closed and convex. Thus, potential games [19] belong to a
particular class of games characterized by the existence of
a potential function P : X → R, with X := ∏i∈I Xi, such
that, for all i ∈ I, for all x−i, and for all xi, yi ∈ Xi
Ji(xi,x−i)− Ji(yi,x−i) = P (xi,x−i)− P (yi,x−i). (1)
One of the key ingredients of game theory is the concept of
NE, defined as follows.
Definition 2: A collective vector x∗ := (x∗1; . . . ;x
∗
N ) ∈
X is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ if, for all i ∈ I,
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf
xi∈Xi
Ji(xi,x
∗
−i). (2)

Since each feasible set Xi is independent from the strate-
gies adopted by the neighbors, x−i, the problem in (2)
generically refers to a NEP [18]. We finally introduce the
pseudo-gradient mapping of the game, F : X → Rn, defined
as F(x) := (∇xiJi(x))i∈I , and we characterize a NE via
variational inequalities, according to the following result.
Lemma 1 ([18, Cor. 1]): A collective vector x∗ ∈ X is a
variational equilibrium of the game Γ if and only if it satisfies
the variational inequality
(y − x∗)>F(x∗) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ X .

III. CONSTRAINED CONTROL OF AGENTS WITH
DOUBLE-INTEGRATOR DYNAMICS
This section introduces the constrained, multi-agent con-
trol problem addressed and derives the port-Hamiltonian
model for the set of double-integrator agents. Successively,
virtual couplings are introduced to control the overall system,
forcing the distance-based constraints that couple the agents.
In details, we deal with the following problem.
Problem 1: A set of double-integrator agents has to be
controlled to a stable configuration, while satisfying some
critical, distance-based constraints. 
Specifically, we consider N agents belonging to the set
I := {1, . . . , N}, where each agent i ∈ I is a single point
(unitary) mass governed by a double-integrator dynamics:
q¨i = ui.
Here, qi ∈ Rn denotes the generalized coordinate of the
i-th agent, and ui ∈ Rn its control input. The corresponding
linear momentum pi ∈ Rn, is given by pi = q˙i, for all
i ∈ I. By recalling that the kinetic energy associated to the
i-th mass, hki : Rn → R≥0, is explicitly given by
hki (q˙i) =
1
2
q˙>i q˙i =
1
2
p>i pi,
and by assuming that each output yi =
∂hki
∂pi
, i ∈ I, the single
agent dynamics in the port-Hamiltonian framework reads as:
∀i ∈ I :
(
q˙i
p˙i
)
=
(
0 In
0 0
)( ∂hki
∂qi
∂hki
∂pi
)
+
(
0
In
)
ui.
Then, to compactly characterize the dynamics of the whole
set, we introduce q := (q1; . . . ; qN ) ∈ RnN as the vector
of generalized coordinates, and u := (u1; . . . ;uN ) ∈ RnN
as the control vector. Therefore, with y = ∂H
k
∂p , the overall
dynamics reads as:(
q˙
p˙
)
=
(
0 InN
0 0
)( ∂Hk
∂q
∂Hk
∂p
)
+
(
0
InN
)
u,
where Hk : RnN → R≥0, Hk(q) =
∑
i∈I h
k
i (q˙i) =
1
2 q˙
>q˙ =
1
2p
>p, represents the global kinematic contribution.
A. Modeling the network of agents
By considering the pair of agents (i, j) ∈ I2, for instance,
we say that the constraint between them is satisfied if their
relative position ‖qj(t) − qi(t)‖ is lower than a critical
distance rc > 0, for all t ≥ 0.
Thus, to specify the coupling constraints among the agents
within the set, we build up a graph G := (V,E), where the
vertex set V coincides with I and the edge set E is defined
over each distance-based constraint. Consequently, |V | = N
and, by assuming M constraints, |E| = M .
Since we are dealing with a physical system and we are
interested in defining a vector of relative distances, it seems
reasonable to give an arbitrary orientation to each edge.
Specifically, by considering the pair (i, j) ∈ E, we assume
the vertex i as the tail and j as the head of the edge. Thus,
the incidence matrix B ∈ RN×M , with generic entry bi,j ,
summarizes the orientation of each edge in E. Therefore,
the vector of relative distances z ∈ RnM reads as
z := (B> ⊗ In) q = B¯ q. (3)
With a slight abuse of notation, we henceforth refer to
a generic edge j ∈ E corresponding to the pair of agents
(i, k). Hence, it follows that, for example, zj := qk − qi.
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Fig. 1: An example of elastic potential hsj , with rj = 0.6,
rc = 1, kj1 = 0.8 and kj2 = 0.06.
B. Virtual couplings and energetic description of the network
To solve Problem 1, we associate to each edge of G a
virtual coupling, i.e., a pair of spring-damper in parallel. We
denote with wj ∈ Rn the input velocity at its ends and with
fj ∈ Rn the corresponding output force. Thus, the dynamics
of each spring-damper subsystem reads as [9], [10]:
∀j ∈ E :

z˙j = wj ,
fj =
∂hsj
∂zj
+Dcjwj .
(4)
Specifically, the injected damping that corresponds to
each edge j ∈ E is denoted by Dcj ∈ Sn0 (dissipation
matrix), while hsj : Rn → R≥0 represents the Hamiltonian
contribution of the j-th pair of spring-damper. In particular,
the latter results from a (possibly) nonlinear spring kj(zj)
and directly depends on the relative position of the agents
identified by the j-th edge. Formally, it reads as
hsj(zj) =
1
2
kj(zj)(‖zj‖ − rj)2, (5)
for some rest length 0 ≤ rj ≤ rc and kj : Kj → R>0,
where Kj := {zj ∈ Rn | ‖zj‖ ≤ r}, with r > 0. The choice
to restrict the domain of each kj to Kj , however, limits the
set of possible initial positions of each agent.
Since the virtual couplings are substantially design param-
eters, we introduce the following assumption on the choice
of the spring kj , for all j ∈ E.
Standing Assumption 1: For all j ∈ E, kj : Kj → R>0 is
a C1, even function of the relative position zj . 
In this way, hsj can be shaped to obtain a desired, symmet-
ric, intra-agents behaviour. As an example, let us consider
the elastic potential shown in Fig. 1, which results as a
contribution of a nonlinear spring, and it is formally given
by:
hsj =

kj1(‖zj‖ − rj)2, if ‖zj‖ ≤ rj
kj2
rc − ‖zj‖ (‖zj‖ − rj)
2, otherwise
(6)
for some kj1 , kj2 > 0. In this case Kj is defined by r < rc.
Consequently, the Hamiltonian function of the whole
network, H : RnM×nN , is given by:
H(z, p) =
∑
i∈I
hki (pi) +
∑
j∈E
hsj(zj)
=
1
2
∑
i∈I
p>i pi +
1
2
∑
j∈E
kj(zj)(‖zj‖ − rj)2.
(7)
By choosing the vector (z; p) ∈ Rn(M+N) as state variable,
we have again y = ∂H∂p and the port-Hamilton formulation
of the open-loop system is(
z˙
p˙
)
=
(
0 B¯
0 0
)( ∂H
∂z
∂H
∂p
)
+
(
0
InN
)
u. (8)
C. Control synthesis and stability analysis
The input velocity can be written as w = B¯y = B¯ ∂H∂p .
Consequently, by exploiting the forces generated at the
edges, we obtain the following distributed control law:
u = −B¯>f = −B¯>
(
DcB¯
∂H
∂p
+
∂H
∂z
)
, (9)
with Dc = diag(Dcj), j ∈ E. Hence, the closed-loop system
reads as:(
z˙
p˙
)
=
(
0 B¯
−B¯> −B¯>DcB¯
)( ∂H
∂z
∂H
∂p
)
. (10)
Before stating a first result, we introduce the following set
Z :=
{
z¯ ∈ RnM
∣∣∣ ker(B¯>) 3 ∂H
∂z
∣∣∣
z=z¯
}
, (11)
which gathers the equilibrium points among the forces gen-
erated over the edges with assigned virtual couplings.
Proposition 1: The solution of the closed-loop system
(10) converges to the set of points S := {(z; p) ∈
Rn(M+N) | z ∈ Z, p = 0}. 
Proof: Take H(z, p) as a positive, radially unbounded,
semi-definite Lyapunov candidate for the system in (10). Its
time derivative reads as
H˙ =
∂>H
∂p
p˙+
∂>H
∂z
z˙ = −∂
>H
∂p
B¯>DcB¯
∂H
∂p
≤ 0. (12)
Hence, by invoking the LaSalle principle, the solutions to
(10) converge to the largest invariant set where p = 0, i.e.,
−B¯> ∂H
∂z
= 0.
Corollary 1: If zj(0) ∈ Kj , defined for some r < rc, for
all j ∈ E, then the solution of the closed-loop system (10)
satisfies the distance-based constraints, for all t ≥ 0. 
Proof: Since H˙ in (12) is negative semi-definite, given
initial conditions (z(0); p(0)), it holds that H(z(t), p(t)) ≤
H(z(0), p(0)) for all t ≥ 0, and the trajectories of (10)
are bounded, namely there exists some µ ≥ 0, such that
‖(z(t); p(t))‖ ≤ µ for all t ≥ 0.
Note that assuming zj(0) ∈ Kj , defined for r < rc, for all
j ∈ E, is not exceedingly conservative, since distance-based
constraints may be defined for communication purposes,
reflecting on the possibility to compute the control in (9).
Therefore, for the remainder of the paper, we consider valid
such assumption.
IV. POTENTIAL GAME CHARACTERIZATION
Next, we provide some equivalence results that charac-
terize the port-Hamiltonian system in (10) with distance-
based constraints as an exact potential game. For simplicity,
we henceforth consider virtual springs with elastic constant
independent from zj , i.e., kj(zj) = kj .
A. Potential game setup
1) Local and collective strategies: In our formulation, the
player set coincides with I, i.e., the set of double-integrator
agents. Then, we assume that each agent makes decision on
its position and velocity, and the local decision variable is
xi :=
(
qi
q˙i
)
∈ Xi ⊂ R2n,
for some compact and convex set Xi, for all i ∈ I.
Clearly, since the agents follow a certain dynamics, qi
and q˙i can not be chosen independently. Thus, the collective
vector of strategies reads as:
x :=
(
q
q˙
)
∈ X ⊂ R2nN , where X :=
∏
i∈I
Xi.
Note that the state variable for the port-Hamiltonian sys-
tem in (10) can be written as:
xpH :=
(
z
p
)
=
(
B¯ 0
0 InN
)
x. (13)
Lemma 2: The convergence of xpH to some x˜ ∈ S implies
the convergence of x to some x¯ ∈ X . 
Proof: The point x˜ is of the form (z˜; 0). Then, from
(13), q˙ → 0, while q → q¯ that satisfies B¯q¯ = z˜.
2) Local objective functions: By defining Li := {j ∈
E | bi,j 6= 0} as the set of edges that involve the i-th player,
for all i ∈ I, we identify each local objective function as:
Ji(xi,x−i) = hi(xi,x−i) = hki (xi) +
∑
`∈Li
hs`(xi,x−i)
=
1
2
(
q˙>i q˙i +
∑
`∈Li
k` (‖qi − qk‖ − r`)2
)
. (14)
Thus, we assume that every decision maker i ∈ I seeks for
a feasible strategy that minimizes its energetic contribution
within the network:
∀i ∈ I : min
xi∈Xi
Ji(xi,x−i). (15)
3) The potential function: Let us consider the Hamilto-
nian function in (7). Due to the symmetric contribution of
each virtual spring, it can be equivalently rewritten as:
H(z, p) =
1
2
∑
i∈I
(
p>i pi +
1
2
∑
`∈Li
k` (‖z`‖ − r`)2
)
.
Proposition 2: The game Γ := (I, {Ji}i∈I , {Xi}i∈I) is
an exact potential game with potential function H(x). 
Proof: Take an arbitrary player i ∈ I, a feasible rivals’
strategy vector x−i and two feasible strategies xi = (qi; q˙i),
x¯i = (q¯i; ˙¯qi) ∈ Xi. Then, by directly applying (1), we have:
Ji(xi,x−i)− Ji(x¯i,x−i) =
hki (q˙i)− hki ( ˙¯qi) +
∑
`∈Li
(hs`(qi, qk)− hs`(q¯i, qk)) . (16)
Since the kinetic contribution depends on the local variable
only, by adding and subtracting in (16) the term hkj(q˙j) for
all j ∈ I \{i}, we obtain both Hk(q˙) and −Hk( ˙¯qi, q˙−i). By
referring to the elastic potential, we exploit the symmetry of
the springs, separating the contribution of all players except
the i-th one as described next:
1
2
∑
j∈I\{i}
∑
`∈Lj
hs`(qj , qk) =
1
2
∑
j∈I\{i}
 ∑
`∈Lj∩Li
hs`(qj , qi)
+
∑
`∈Lj\Li
hs`(qj , qk)
 . (17)
Here, Lj ∩ Li contains the edges that connect the agents
with the i-th one, while Lj \Li gathers the edges that do not
directly involve the agent i. Thus, we can add and subtract
(17), considering both xi and x¯i. In the latter case, (17) is:
1
2
∑
j∈I\{i}
 ∑
`∈Lj∩Li
hs`(qj , q¯i) +
∑
`∈Lj\Li
hs`(qj , qk)
 .
After some manipulations, the relation in (16) becomes:
Ji(xi,x−i)− Ji(x¯i,x−i) = Hk(q˙)−Hk( ˙¯qi, q˙−i)
+
1
2
∑
`∈Li
hs`(qi, qk) +
1
2
∑
j∈I\{i}
 ∑
`∈Lj∩Li
hs`(qj , qi)
+
∑
`∈Lj\Li
hs`(qj , qk)
− 1
2
∑
`∈Li
hs`(q¯i, qk)
− 1
2
∑
j∈I\{i}
 ∑
`∈Lj∩Li
hs`(qj , q¯i) +
∑
`∈Lj\Li
hs`(qj , qk)

= H(xi,x−i)−H(x¯i,x−i),
which concludes the proof.
Since each virtual coupling determines a symmetric en-
ergetic contribution, i.e., hsj(qj , qi) = h
s
j(qi, qj), and each
kinetic contribution depends on the local variable only, such
a potential game belongs to the class of Bilateral Symmetric
Interaction (BSI) games [19], [20]. Hence, the potential
function can be equivalently written as
H(x) =
∑
i∈I
hki (q˙i) + ∑
j∈I, j≺i
hsj(qj , qi)
 , (18)
where j ≺ i identifies a predefined ordering within the player
set I. It follows by [20, §2] that every BSI game is an exact
potential game with potential function of the form (18).
B. Nash equilibrium seeking
Once proved the equivalence between the control problem
addressed and a potential game, here we study the conver-
gence of the constrained, multi-agent system to some NE.
We recall that the port-Hamiltonian model in (10) assumes
the following “collective”, gradient-based dynamics
x˙pH = −K ∇H(xpH), (19)
with K :=
(
0 −B¯
B¯> B¯>DcB¯
)
< 0, and it converges to the set
of points S. Next, we give a convergence result, showing that
each point in S corresponds to a variational equilibrium.
Proposition 3: Any x∗ ∈ S is a variational equilibrium
of the exact potential game Γ. 
Proof: For all i ∈ I, the gradient of Ji(xi,x−i)
calculated with respect to the local variable xi reads as
∇xiJi(xi,x−i) =

∑
`∈Li
bi,`k`
(
1− r`‖qi−qk‖
)
(qi − qk)
q˙i
 ,
where the element bi,` of the matrix B¯ is needed for the
correct sign of the partial derivative ∂Ji(xi,x−i)/∂xi.
Thus, by stacking and re-arranging the gradient of each
player, the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game reads as:
F (x) =

B¯>(1,:)
∂H
∂z
...
B¯>(N,:)
∂H
∂z
q˙1
...
q˙N

=
(
B¯> 0
0 InN
)
∇H(xpH),
where B¯>(i,:) selects the i-th row of the matrix B¯
>. Therefore,
the pseudo-gradient F evaluated at any equilibrium point
x∗ ∈ S is null. Since H is a positive semi-definite, bounded
from below function, it follows that any x∗ ∈ S solves the
associated variational inequality problem and hence it is a
variational equilibrium of the potential game.
Corollary 2: Given any x(0) ∈ X , the closed-loop, port-
Hamiltonian system in (10) converges to a NE of the exact
potential game, satisfying the constraints for all t ≥ 0. 
Proof: The proof follows directly as a consequence of
Propositions 1 and 3, Lemma 2 and Corollary 1.
Now, let us consider the case in which the graph G is
connected and acyclic (loop-free). In this case, the control
law in (9) leads the system to the global minimum of H ,
i.e., at the equilibrium point in which each virtual spring
is at its rest length. In view of the equivalence in Prop. 2,
this minimum corresponds to a NE. Note that this condition
represents the ideal outcome in several, multi-agent control
problems, e.g., formation control.
Proposition 4: Let G be a connected and acyclic graph.
Then, the collective dynamics in (19) converges to a NE of
the associated exact potential game Γ. 
Proof: Since the graph G is acyclic, its incidence matrix
satisfies ker(B¯>) = ∅. Thus, by replicating the proof of
Prop. 1, the system in (10) converges to the largest invariant
set where p = 0, that leads to the set of z such that:
∂H
∂z
∣∣∣
z=z¯
= 0.
This implies that ∇H(z¯, 0) = 0, which corresponds to the
global minimum of the Hamiltonian function H , and hence
of the exact potential function.
Conversely, the convergence to the global minimum of H
does not imply that G is acyclic (see the example in §V).
As a final remark, we stress that the convergence of xpH
in (19) depends on Dc, containing the damping parameter of
each virtual coupling, which allows to shape the transient
response. In parallel, the set Z in (11) depends on each
artificial potential hsj , j ∈ E, introduced with the virtual
couplings. In this way, each (nonlinear) spring influences the
asymptotic behaviour of the network of agents, i.e., the set
of reachable equilibria of the associated potential game Γ.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In Fig. 2 is reported an example involving 9 agents and
16 randomly chosen constraints. In details, we have:
E = {(1, 2), (1, 4), (1, 8), (1, 9), (2, 3), (2, 6), (2, 7), (3, 5),
(3, 6), (3, 8), (4, 5), (4, 7), (6, 7), (6, 9), (7, 8), (7, 9)}
A virtual coupling, designed with a constant damper and
a nonlinear spring that shapes the energetic contribution
in Fig. 1, is assigned to each edge. Fig. 2(a) shows the
convergence of xpH to a NE of the associated potential game,
while Fig. 2(b) highlights the “exploration” in R2 of the
constrained set of agents, seeking for a set of positions that
trade off the fulfillment of the distance-based constraints (as
shown in Fig. 2(c)) and the minimization of the potential
function. Note that, despite the associated graph G is cyclic,
‖zj‖ → 0.6 for all j ∈ E, i.e., to the rest length rj of each
spring. Accordingly, H(t)→ 0 as t→∞ (Fig. 2(d)).
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The distributed, gradient-based control algorithm (9) is
suitable to steer the multi-agent system with distance-based
constraints to an equilibrium point. Since the pairs of spring-
damper are basically design parameters, they offer the possi-
bility to shape the transient behaviour of the network, fulfill-
ing the constraints and maintaining the stability. Moreover,
by exploiting the equivalence relations with potential games,
this framework allows to shape and, ideally, determine in
advance the potential function, its set of local minima and,
consequently, the set of NE related with the game.
Future research will investigate an optimal procedure to
shape the artificial potentials hsj , introduced with virtual
couplings, and hence the reachable set of Nash equilibria.
Moreover, additional technical assumptions will be investi-
gated toward a generalization of the proposed framework, to
embrace a broader class of networked, multi-agent systems
that admit a port-Hamiltonian formulation.
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Fig. 2: (a) Convergence of xpH to a NE, x∗ ∈ S . (b)
“Exploration” of the constrained set of agents from a random
starting point (colored asterisks) to an equilibrium (colored
diamonds). (c) Relative distances. (d) Hamiltonian function.
